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h i g h l i g h t s
• We study a static moral hazard setting with non-contractible quality.
• The buyer privately observes quality before trade.
• Sellers have private information about the cost and choice of effort.
• The buyer prefers to contract with a team rather than with each seller individually.
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a b s t r a c t
This paper shows that buying from a team of sellers can be optimal for the buyer in a static model where
the buyer has private information about quality, sellers have private information about the cost and choice
of effort, and quality is not contractible.
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This paper studies when contracting with a team of agents
rather than with each agent individually to trade a good is ben-
eficial to the principal in an environment with moral hazard and
non-contractible quality.We consider a staticmodelwhere a buyer
(principal) has private information about product quality, sellers
(agents) have private information about the cost and choice of ef-
fort and are protected by limited liability, and a feasible contract
can only have payments that are contingent on the volumeof trade.
For example, these modeling assumptions may describe contract-
ing in an agricultural market with collective selling by smallholder
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setting moral hazard arises even if the buyer can perfectly infer
the seller’s efforts. Suppose that the buyer contracts with a seller
individually in the sense that the buyer decides whether to buy the
product from that seller independently of her other purchasing de-
cisions. The seller will then be tempted to reduce the buyer’s gain
from trade until the buyer is just indifferent between buying and
rejecting the product. If the seller has perfect information about the
buyer’s willingness to pay, the buyer’s rent will be completely dis-
sipated. In this case, formation of a small team of sellers mitigates
their temptation to shirk on quality in spite of the free-riding prob-
lem. This happens because joint selling introduces endogenous
uncertainty about the quality of the team’s output that makes low-
cost sellersmorewilling to exert greater efforts in order to increase
the probability of sale. 1
1 Section 4 demonstrates that formation of teams can also be optimal when
signals are noisy.
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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uncertainty can improve reputation building in small teams (part-
nerships) is explored in Bar-Isaac (2007).2 Here we show that the
buyer can also benefit from team production. Our paper is re-
lated to the literature on the endogenous team size andmoral haz-
ard in the presence of subjective evaluations. Auriol et al. (2002)
and Rauh (2015) consider complementary efforts that capture pro-
duction activities performed within firms. In our case, efforts are
substitutable and the principal observes performance before trade
occurs. In Liang et al. (2008), efforts are substitutable but the firm
employs at most one team of workers, while our buyer can hire
multiple one-seller teams.
Rejection of the agent’s product represents a short-term pun-
ishment that corresponds to contract termination in a prin-
cipal–agent model with relational contracting and subjective
monitoring of the agent’s performance (e.g. Levin, 2003). This pa-
per demonstrates that, unlike in the dynamicmodels of moral haz-
ardwith repeated interaction, in the presence of purely short-term
incentives the principal may prefer to inject additional noise into
the agent’s assessment of her benefit from the relationship.
2. Model
We consider a static model with a profit-maximizing principal
(buyer) and two identical agents (sellers), A and B. All players are
risk-neutral and the outside options of all players are normalized to
zero. Each seller iproduces atmost one unit at no cost and privately
chooses the level of effort ei ≥ 0 at cost C(eiθi), where C is a
strictly increasing, convex, and twice differentiable function with
C(0) = 0, C ′(0) ≥ 1, and inverse C−1. Seller i’s ‘‘type’’ θi ∈ [0, 1] is
independently drawn froma continuous differentiable distribution
F with a strictly positive density f on [0, 1]. Each seller is privately
informed about her own type, but it is not observed by the other
seller and the buyer. From each unit the buyer obtains utility qi =
ei if unit i is purchased, and zero utility if the unit is not purchased.
The buyer can buy from each seller i individually, bi ∈ {0, 1}, or
jointly from a team of two sellers, b ∈ {0, 2}. In the latter case, the
buyer is constrained to buy either both units or none.3 If the sellers
sell individually, the buyer observes qi before making a purchasing
decision. If the sellers sell jointly as a team, the buyer only observes
the average quality, y = 12 (q1 + q2).4 Under both individual and
joint selling, the signals of quality are not verifiable.
Under individual selling, the buyer offers a contract (w0, w1)
to each seller i with transfers that depend on the acceptance or
rejection of the seller’s product, bi ∈ {0, 1}. Under joint selling,
the buyer offers a contract (w0, w2) to each seller with transfers
that depend on the acceptance or rejection of the team’s output,
b ∈ {0, 2}.5 We assume that the sellers are subject to limited
liability and cannot be forced to make positive transfers to the
buyer, w0, w1, w2 ≥ 0. Under individual selling the buyer’s per
seller average profit is 12

i∈{A,B} biqi−wbi , and the payoff of seller
i iswbi − C(eiθi). Under joint selling, the buyer’s per seller profit is
1
2by− wb, and the payoff of seller i iswb − C(eiθi).
The game proceeds as follows.
1. The buyer publicly chooses whether she will trade with each
seller individually or as a team.
2 Peer 0monitoring can also mitigate free-riding in teams concerned with
reputation building (Saak, 2012).
3 We could easily allow the buyer to buy a fraction of output. A risk-neutral buyer
will prefer to buy all or none of the team’s output if the purchased fraction of output
is chosen at random.
4 One example is dairy farmers pooling their milk before the buyer assesses milk
quality.
5 These individual contracts are equivalent to a group contract.2. The buyer offers a contract (w0, w1) under individual selling or
(w0, w2) under joint selling to each seller.
3. Each seller privately observes his cost θi and chooses the level
of effort, ei.
4. The buyer privately observes the individual quality, qi, or the
average quality, y.
5. The buyer decides whether to buy or reject individual products,
bi, or the team’s output, b.
6. The payoffs are realized.
3. Equilibrium
We solve for a subgame perfect equilibrium. The first-best level
of effort that maximizes surplus from trade,W (e, θ) = e− C(θe),
is given by eFB(θ) = C ′−1(1/θ)/θ for θ ≤ θ FB and eFB(θ) = 0
for θ > θ FB, where θ FB ∈ (0, 1) solves W (eFB(θ FB), θ FB) =
C ′−1(1/θ FB)/θ FB − C(C ′−1(1/θ FB)) = 0, so that only trade with
low-cost sellers, θi ≤ θ FB, is efficient.
3.1. Individual selling
Under individual selling the buyer cannot earn a positive profit
when sellers have perfect information about the buyer’s valuation
for the good. To see why, note that the buyer purchases a seller’s
product if
ei − w1 ≥ −w0. (1)
Therefore, a seller leaves the buyer indifferent between buying and
not buying, ei = w1−w0, ifw1−w0−C(θi[w1−w0]) ≥ 0, or exerts
zero (the lowest possible) effort, ei = 0, if w1 − w0 − C(θi[w1 −
w0]) < 0. Summarizing, the unique equilibrium effort strategy is
given by
e∗1(θi) =

w1 − w0, if θi ≤ C−1(w1 − w0)/(w1 − w0)
0, if θi > C−1(w1 − w0)/(w1 − w0) , (2)
where subscript ‘‘1’’ denotes the ‘‘individual selling’’ regime. Since
e∗1(θi) − w1 ≤ 0 for any w0, w1 ≥ 0, θi ∈ [0, 1], the buyer can
achieve at most zero profit.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium the buyer earns zero profit under
individual selling.
3.2. Joint selling
Under joint selling the buyer accepts the team’s output if
y− w2 ≥ −w0, (3)
and the expected profit of seller i is given by
Pr{y ≥ w2 − w0}(w2 − w0)+ w0 − C(θiei). (4)
Conditional on contract (w0, w2) having being signed by both
sellers, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium at the effort choice stage
is a function e∗2 : [0, 1] → ℜ+ such that
e∗2(θ) ∈ argmax
e≥0
Pr

1
2
[e+ e∗2(θi)] ≥ w2 − w0

(w2 − w0)
+w0 − C(θe) for each θ ∈ [0, 1]. (5)
Here subscript ‘‘2’’ denotes the ‘‘joint selling’’ regime.
First, note that an outcome where each seller exerts the same
minimum effort that leaves the buyer indifferent, e i =w2 − w0
for all θi ∈ [0, 1], is not an equilibrium, because w2 − C(θi(w2 −
w0)) < w0 for all θi close to 1 for any w2 − w0 > 0. Therefore, in
any equilibrium with trade it must be that e∗2 is a non-increasing
function of seller’s type with e∗2(0) > e
∗
2(1). This means that there
90 A.E. Saak / Economics Letters 136 (2015) 88–91exists a threshold type θˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that e∗2(θ) > w2 − w0
for θ ≤ θˆ and e∗2(θ) ≤ w2 − w0 for θ > θˆ , because otherwise
it must be that either e∗2(θ) ≤ w2 − w0 or e∗2(θ) ≥ w2 − w0 for
all θ , which cannot be the best response for all types. Second, note
that the sellers will sign a contract with (w0, w2) = (0, w) for any
w > 0 as it guarantees them a non-negative payoff.
Therefore, in any equilibrium the buyer can earn a strictly
positive expected (per seller) profit:
1
2
E

max
 
i∈{A,B}
e∗2(θi)− 2w, 0

≥ F 2(θˆ)[e∗2(θˆ)− w] > 0. (6)
The first inequality follows because, under a contract (w0, w2) =
(0, w), the buyer can always earn a zero payoff ex post (after the
team’s output is offered for sale) by rejecting the team’s output, and
e∗2(θ) ≥ e∗2(θˆ) > w for all θ ≤ θˆ . The second inequality follows
because, there is a strictly positive probability Pr(θA ≤ θˆ , θB ≤
θˆ ) = F 2(θˆ) that the average effort will exceed the incremental
payment,w2 − w0 = w.
For example, an equilibrium strategy may take the following
form
e∗2(θ) =

(1+ α)(w2 − w0), if θ ≤ θˆ
(1− α)(w2 − w0), if θ > θˆ (7)
for some 0 < α ≤ 1. e∗2 is a fixed point of the map defined by (5) if
w2 − C[(1+ α)(w2 − w0)θ ]  
Payoff from effort (1+α)(w2−w0)
≥ (<) F(θˆ)w2 + [1− F(θˆ)]w0 − C[(1− α)(w2 − w0)θ ]  
Payoff from effort (1−α)(w2−w0)
(8)
for all θ ≤ (>)θˆ , and
F(θˆ)w2 + [1− F(θˆ)]w0 − C[(1− α)(w2 − w0)θ ]  
Payoff from effort (1−α)(w2−w0)
≥ w0
Payoff from zero effort
(9)
for all θ ≥ θˆ and α < 1. To understand conditions (8) and (9), note
that any effort e i ∉ {0, (1−α)(w2−w0), (1+α)(w2−w0)} cannot
be optimal because the same probability of sale can be achieved
at a lower cost. Hence, θˆ must satisfy the following system of
equations:
w2 − w0 = F(θˆ)(w2 − w0)+ C[(1+ α)(w2 − w0)θˆ ]
− C[(1− α)(w2 − w0)θˆ ], (10)
F(θˆ)(w2 − w0)− C[(1− α)(w2 − w0)] ≥ 0. (11)
Because the right-hand side of (10) h(θˆ) ≡ F(θˆ)(w2−w0)+C[(1+
α)(w2−w0)θˆ ]−C[(1−α)(w2−w0)θˆ ] is increasing in θˆ , h(0) = 0,
and h(1) > w2−w0, Eq. (10) has a unique solution,while condition
(11) is satisfied for any α sufficiently close to 1. Summarizing,
Proposition 2. In equilibrium the buyer earns a positive profit under
joint selling.
4. Exogenous shocks to quality
We now show that joint selling can also be optimal in an en-
vironment with stochastic quality. Specifically, the buyer now ob-
tains utility qi = ei + εi, where quality shock εi ∼ N(0, σ 2) is
drawn independently across sellers.
Now, under individual selling, if a seller exerts effort e, the buyer
accepts with probabilityPr(e+ εi ≥ w1 − w0) = 1− Φ

w1 − w0 − e
σ

. (12)
Thus, after signing the contract, a seller solves
max
e

1− Φ

w1 − w0 − e
σ

(w1 − w0)+ w0 − C(θie), (13)
and e∗1 satisfies the optimality condition:
1
σ
ϕ

w1 − w0 − e∗1(θ)
σ

(w1 − w0)− θC ′(θe∗1(θ)) ≤ 0. (14)
Because, as σ goes to zero, the effort strategy defined by (14)
converges to strategy (2), the buyer’s profit converges to zero as
well.
Under joint selling, if a seller (say seller A) puts in effort e, the
buyer accepts with probability
Pr

1
2
[e+ e∗2(θB)+ εA + εB] ≥ w2 − w0

= 1−
 1
0
Φ

w2 − w0 − 12 [e+ e∗2(θB)]
σ/
√
2

dF(θB). (15)
Thus, after signing the contract, the seller’s problem becomes
max
e≥0

1−
 1
0
Φ

w2 − w0 − 12 [e+ e∗2(θB)]
σ/
√
2

dF(θB)

× (w2 − w0)+ w0 − C(θAe). (16)
The equilibrium strategy e∗2(θ) is now defined by the following
first-order optimality condition
1
σ
√
2
 1
0
ϕ

w2 − w0 − 12 [e∗2(θ)+ e∗2(θB)]
σ/
√
2

dF(θB)
× (w2 − w0)− θC ′(θe∗2(θ)) ≤ 0 for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. (17)
From (17) it follows that, as σ goes to zero, e∗2(θ) > w for θ suffi-
ciently close to 0 in any equilibrium under a contract (w0, w2) =
(0, w),w > 0. Because the buyer can refuse to buy the team’s out-
put at zero cost, this demonstrates that the buyer’s profit is strictly
bounded away from zero for any σ ≥ 0.
5. Conclusions
We considered a moral hazard setting with contracts that are
contingent on quantity but are not contingent on quality of the
traded good, which makes incentivizing incremental efforts very
costly to the principal. Our main result is that joint selling can be
beneficial even though it has a heterogeneous effect on efforts,
whereas efforts increase when the cost is low and decrease when
the cost is high. Although in our model there is no communication
within the team, the sellers have a strong incentive to collude
against the buyer in order to save costs. In a static environment
without intra-team transfers, the equilibrium outcome will not
change in the presence of cheap talk communication as each seller
will prefer to mimic the high-cost type. However, in a dynamic
model with repeated interaction, the benefits of joint selling for
the buyer will decrease if the sellers are able to coordinate their
efforts such that low-cost sellers take turns in exerting efforts or
all types choose the level of effort that leaves the buyer with no
surplus in every period.6
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